NIGERIA MEMORIAL... PART 9*....
NIGERIA MEMORIAL....
....….At about 7.00 am, a day after the coup, Shehu Shagari, a very active member of Balewa cabinet and a strong member of the NPC, returned to Dipcharima’s residence to meet with some NPC ministers who had gathered there. Dipcharima was then the most senior NPC minister available. they received the latest reports on the situation, first from Alhaji Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power, who had visited the PM’s residence by bicycle! then they heard from Alhaji Ibrahim Tako Galadima, the acting Minister of Defence, who had brought along with him Chief Fani-Kayode.
Chief Fani-Kayode said he had been fetched from Ibadan early that morning by rebels and locked up at the Federal Guard Officers Mess in Dodan Barracks, where the mutineers initially made their headquarters. Disguised in army uniform, loyal troops handed him over to Alhaji Galadima, who had called in at the barracks, which was a stone’s throw of his residence…………….
The acting Minister of Defence assured the cabinet members that Major-General Ironsi was doing his best to arrest the situation.
Maitama Sule and Shehu Shagari were separately detailed to explore with their absent NPC and NCNC colleagues the possibility of naming someone to stand in for the PM. Shagari was consulting with NCNC ministers at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence when they heard that the Northern and Western premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola respectively, had been assassinated. Hence they rushed back to Dipcharima’s residence, where they found their colleagues in a state of shock and desperation.
However, majority of the cabinet member being NPC decided to recognize Dipcharima, a Kanuri from Bornu, as the interim leader; and to ask the acting President, Dr. Orizu (President Azikiwe was away on leave), to appoint Dipcharima acting Prime Minister. they also summoned Major General Ironsi and gave him full authority to use every force at his disposal to suppress the rebellion.
in other to do this Major General Ironsi moved his headquarters temporarily to the police headquarters at moloney street to facilitate easy communication with army units in the regions.
While at Dipcharima’s residence, the cabinet members contacted the British High Commission and requested for military assistance in the event that theloyal troops should require any. The response was positive, but the British insisted that the request must be written by the PM; or, in his absence, by a properly appointed deputy. they, therefore, drove to the residence of Dr. Orizu, and requested the acting President,
Nwafor Orizu to swear Diphcharim, a northerner, in as the acting Prime Minister in the
absence of the Prime Minister, whose whereabout was unknown at the time because he cannot
legitimately act as the Prime Minister except he is
sworn- in.
Nwafor Orizu refused!!!!
He said he needed to
contact Zik first, who was then in West Indies.
but Under the law, that is, the Interpretation Act, as
acting President, Nwazor Orizu had all the powers of
the President.
Dr. Orizu Nwafor alsorequested to see the rest of his NCNC colleagues to confirm whether they supported Shagari and his Npc membersproposition, and they joined them soon afterwards. They had apparently been caucusing at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence. He (Mbadiwe) was their choice of acting Prime Minister. This was naturally unacceptable to the NPC members since the NPC was the major governing party.
While they were at Orizu’s residence, Major-General Ironsi, who had seemingly secured Lagos, came in with some armed escorts. He requested for a tete-a-tete with Orizu. The two had a 40 minutes discussion in another room, while the rest of the cabinet members waited anxiously in the sitting room, with the General's stone faced, gun totting armed soldiers standing and staring at politicians expressionlessly. tensions were high and no body dared to move.
When Major-General Ironsi finally emerged, he talked to Dipcharima sotto voce; and then drove off with his troops. Dr. Orizu then joined the rest of the cabinet members, regretted his inability in the circumstances to oblige the NPC members request. He suggested they all return to their homes and wait until they were required.
All efforts to get any clarification failed, and they left in utter desperation.
on Sunday 16th January, all ministers were asked to report to the Cabinet Office at 6.30 pm. The whole premises was surrounded by soldiers in battle order that some of the cabinet members initially hesitated to enter, out of fear of the unknown as the military boys have shown how blood thristy they were with their action at the just failed coup.
In the Cabinet chamber were Major General Ironsi, Bukar Dipcharima and Ibrahim Tako Galadima. There were no officials present. Shagari and a few cabinet members later joined the meeting before
Major General Ironsi admitted to them that he had been unable to suppress the rebellion, which he said was getting out of hand. He stated that the mutineers were in control of Kaduna, Kano and Ibadan, and had killed two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola. They had also murdered a number of his best officers, including Brigadiers Maimalari and Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun, the Commander 1st Brigade Headquarters in Kaduna. Ironsi was full of emotion and even shed some tears. When the politicians asked him about the whereabouts of Sir ABubakar and Chief Okotie-Eboh, he said he still did not know but averred efforts were being made to locate them. At this stage Mbadiwe broke down and kept crying: “Please where is the Prime Minister?”
Ironsi's private coup
When they reminded Major-General Ironsi if he needed to avail himself of the British pledge of assistance, he replied it was too late as the army was pressing him to assume power. Indeed, he confessed his personal reluctance to take over because of his ignorance of government; but insisted the military boys were adamant and anxiously waiting outside.
these words sent rays of fear and anxiety through the hearts of the politicians who were sorrounded by the military boys .
He advised it would be in the cabinet members interest, and that of the country, to temporarily cede power to him to avert disaster.
the threat was boldly written in his words.
I have read in many books from ignorant writers and teachers saying that the cabinet members and politicians
handed over to the military voluntarily . but its all lies! they did not hand-over voluntarily . it was taken from them in a silent office coup!
Ironsi told them that "you either hand over as gentlemen
or you hand-over by force".
Those were his words.
And according to Chief Richard Akinjide, In July 2000, at a public book launching ceremony in Nigeria, (Chief Richard Akinjide, was a member of the Balewa cabinet and present at the meeting on that day ironsi took power from them,) he stated and i quote :
"Is that voluntary hand-over? we did not hand-over. all we wanted was
an Acting Prime Minister to be in place but
Ironsi forced our hands, and I use the word force advisedly,
to handover to him. He was controlling the soldiers.
The acting President, Nwafor Orizu, who did not
cooperate with the rest of us (politicians, cabinet members), cooperated with the GOC. Dr. Orizu
and the GOC prepared speeches which Nwafor Orizu
broadcast handing over the government of the country
to the army. I here state again categorically as an informed
Nigerian and a member of the balewa cabinet, that cabinet members did not hand-over
voluntarily. It was a coup..."
so Accordingly, they acceded to his request since they had no better alternative.
Ironsi then insisted that the understanding be written.
Surprisingly, there was no stationery to write the agreement; and all the offices were locked while no official was around. Alhaji AGF Abdulrazaq the Minister of State for the Railways (former NPC legal adviser), managed to secure a scrap paper on which he drafted a statement, which we endorsed. That was the so called voluntary hand-over of power by the Balewa Government to Major General Ironsi! It was agreed that the statement would be typed and Dipcharima would sign it on their behalf. they were then advised to return home and await further instructions.
Later at 11.50 pm, Dr. Orizu made a terse nationwide broadcast, announcing the cabinet’s voluntary decision to transfer power to the armed forces. Major General Ironsi then made his own broadcast, accepting the “invitation”. He suspended certain parts of the constitution; set up a national military government, with the office of military governors in each region; and briefly outlined the policy intentions of his regime.
Nigeria’s first democratic experiment was effectively over. And although the mutiny had by then practically collapsed, military rule had arrived. It was a fact.
The following morning, 17 January,
it broke that both the PM and Chief Okotie-Eboh had been confirmed killed. news and rumours also hinted that Major General Ironsi was still negotiating with the rebels in Kaduna, led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu.
Then Lt. Col. (later General) Gowon, who was not physically present when the rump cabinet was handing over, says he was later told by Ironsi and other officers (who were outside the cabinet office chambers, and thus did not themselves witness the event) that it was "called" voluntary handover. He recalls asking three separate times to be certain, but now says that had he known it was not, he would have acted differently on that day as the Commander of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja which supported Ironsi in putting down the Ifeajuna-Nzeogwu revolt.
it must be noted that: Nnamdi Azikiwe, also of eastern origin, had left the country in late 1965 first for Europe, then on a health cruise to the caribbean, after allegedly being tipped off by his cousin, Major Ifeajuna, one of the masterminds of the coup and, some say, overall leader.Interestingly, (assuming reports that he had foreknowledge are true) Azikiwe did not notify his alliance partner, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, with whom he had clashed over control of the armed forces during the Constitutional crisis of January 1965, following the controversial December 1964 federal elections.
In fact President Azikiwe’s personal physician, Dr. Humphrey Idemudia Idehen, abandoned him abroad when he got tired of the “health trip”, unaware that there may have been a good reason why Azikiwe did not want to return to Nigeria, after their original planned return date in December 1965 passed. Not even the Commonwealth Leaders’ Conference hosted for the first time by the country in early January was incentive enough for the President to return, for obvious reasons of protocol.However, after the coup, in a statement to the Press in England on January 16, among other things, Azikiwe did not condemn the coup per se, but said:
“Violence has never been an instrument used by us, as founding fathers of the Nigerian Republic, to solve political problems. ….I consider it most unfortunate that our 'Young Turks' decided to introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian politics. No matter how they and our general public might have been provoked by obstinate and perhaps grasping politicians, it is an unwise policy……..As far as I am concerned, I regard the killings of our political and military leaders as a national calamity….”
And in offering condolences for the death of the Sardauna of Sokoto, ex-Senate President Nwafor Orizu told Alhaji Shehu Shagari that Major Nzeogwu was “an unknown entity among the Ibos in the Eastern region.
then again Ironsi agreed not to bring the mutineers to military trial.
these reasons point most soldiers and politicians of the northern origin to believe that clearly the igbos had a grand plan all along and that ironsi take over was a plan B.
Clash Of The Titans
Major Ifeajuna was later to be accused by Major Patrick Nzeogwu, leader of northern operations, of ignoring an apparent understanding to assassinate General Ironsi in Lagos - an oversight, or “misguided consideration” (to use Nzeogwu’s words)that caused the failure of the coup.Indeed, Nzeogwu bluntly declared publicly that the execution of the coup in the South was tribalistic. Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd), leader of operations in the Western region, has since corroborated the view that operations in Lagos were compromised by nepotism.
Those who have defended the January mutiny as being motivated by nationalistic, rather than tribal instincts, say Ironsi escaped because he had gone for a party on a Boat along the Marina that night and was not at home when mutineers allegedly came calling. Tenuous explanations exist for why the Igbo speaking Premiers of the Midwest and Eastern regions were spared and no Igbo commanding or staff officer was specifically targetted. January apologists also say that there were a few non-Igbo officers involved (although none were entrusted with key targets and most were brought in at the last minute). It is argued that the mainly Igbo speaking plotters intended to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a westerner) from jail in Calabar to make him leader. Others interpret the same information, combined with the highly specific pattern of killings, to mean that the coup was carried out by officers sympathetic to the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), although hijacked by the GOC of the Nigerian Army, possibly encouraged by Senate President Nwafor Orizu, and urged on by officers like Lt. Col. Victor Banjo, Lt-Col. Francis Fajuyi, Lt. Col. H. Njoku, Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu and Major Patrick Anwunah.
On January 17,Major General Ironsi established the Supreme Military Council in Lagos and announced Decree No. 1, effectively suspending the constitution, although it was not formally promulgated until March.Later that day Major Nzeogwu, the leader of the revolt in the northern region negotiated a conditional surrender in which Ironsi agreed not to bring the mutineers to military trial.The next day, military governors were appointed for each of the four regions (Major Hassan Katsina – North, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu – East, Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi – West, and Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Midwest).
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo was briefly summoned back from the Imperial Defence College where he was undergoing a course.Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, erstwhile Chief of Staff, Nigerian Defence Forces, was made Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters.Lt. Col. Yakubu Chinwa Gowon, the most senior surviving northern officer, who was in the process of assuming command of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja on January 14/15, a unit which proved critical to restoration of order in Lagos, was made Chief of Staff (Army).
Other early military appointments include:
Chief of Staff (NAF),Lt. Col.George Kurubo (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bde, Lt. Col. H. Njoku (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bn, Major H. Igboba (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Abeokuta Garrison, Major G. Okonweze (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 4 Bn, Major Nzefili (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Federal Guards, Major Ochei (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bn, Major D. Ogunewe (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bde, Lt. ColW. Bassey (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 3 Bn, Major Okoro (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Depot, Major F. Akagha (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 5 Bn,Major M. Shuwa (North)
It is said that there was initial euphoria by the public, even in the far north, against old ministers.However, there were some early problems too, which, to discerning eyes, were pregnant with foreboding.In his book “Years of Challenge”, Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia (rtd) recalls:
“Before January 15, 1966, I had thought that the Nigerian soldier was not blood thirsty, thus ruling out the possibility of a bloody coup. Events proved me wrong and forced me to change my opinion about the Nigerian soldier.Although the ordinary man on the street welcomed the CHANGE of government, rejoiced and danced away in ecstatic jubilation, the atmosphere was muggy.”
For example, in the West, AG/UPGA supporters settled scores against supporters of former Premier Akintola’s NNDP, creating a major crisis which evolved into an international refugee problem.It is said that 2000 refugees fled across the border to neighbouring Dahomey before the border was closed from January 16-26.No less than a thousand people were killed in the melee before Lt. Col.FA Fajuyi, the new military governor, detained surviving NNDP supporters allegedly for their own protection.In the North, there were some subdued early signs of a recoil among civilian elite, while unrest simmered in the Army.The net result was that Ironsi quickly felt threatened by Nzeogwu's supporters on one hand, and upset northern troops on the other.
at this point a full scale rebellion was eminent but no one knew for sure where it will emanate from.. will the igbo soldiers return in a much stronger form to finish off the rest of the northerners in power to actualize their earlier suspected motive?
will the northern soldiers rise up against their igbo counterperts in revenge for what they termed a "betrayal of trust in the army"?
The country and its military at the time, was like a grenade with a faulty pin.
........ Then it happened... and that gave birth to a man termed the hero of the igbos from the primitive tribes of the lower Niger!
.... stay tuned... NIGERIA MEMORIAL..
....….At about 7.00 am, a day after the coup, Shehu Shagari, a very active member of Balewa cabinet and a strong member of the NPC, returned to Dipcharima’s residence to meet with some NPC ministers who had gathered there. Dipcharima was then the most senior NPC minister available. they received the latest reports on the situation, first from Alhaji Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power, who had visited the PM’s residence by bicycle! then they heard from Alhaji Ibrahim Tako Galadima, the acting Minister of Defence, who had brought along with him Chief Fani-Kayode.
Chief Fani-Kayode said he had been fetched from Ibadan early that morning by rebels and locked up at the Federal Guard Officers Mess in Dodan Barracks, where the mutineers initially made their headquarters. Disguised in army uniform, loyal troops handed him over to Alhaji Galadima, who had called in at the barracks, which was a stone’s throw of his residence…………….
The acting Minister of Defence assured the cabinet members that Major-General Ironsi was doing his best to arrest the situation.
Maitama Sule and Shehu Shagari were separately detailed to explore with their absent NPC and NCNC colleagues the possibility of naming someone to stand in for the PM. Shagari was consulting with NCNC ministers at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence when they heard that the Northern and Western premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola respectively, had been assassinated. Hence they rushed back to Dipcharima’s residence, where they found their colleagues in a state of shock and desperation.
However, majority of the cabinet member being NPC decided to recognize Dipcharima, a Kanuri from Bornu, as the interim leader; and to ask the acting President, Dr. Orizu (President Azikiwe was away on leave), to appoint Dipcharima acting Prime Minister. they also summoned Major General Ironsi and gave him full authority to use every force at his disposal to suppress the rebellion.
in other to do this Major General Ironsi moved his headquarters temporarily to the police headquarters at moloney street to facilitate easy communication with army units in the regions.
While at Dipcharima’s residence, the cabinet members contacted the British High Commission and requested for military assistance in the event that theloyal troops should require any. The response was positive, but the British insisted that the request must be written by the PM; or, in his absence, by a properly appointed deputy. they, therefore, drove to the residence of Dr. Orizu, and requested the acting President,
Nwafor Orizu to swear Diphcharim, a northerner, in as the acting Prime Minister in the
absence of the Prime Minister, whose whereabout was unknown at the time because he cannot
legitimately act as the Prime Minister except he is
sworn- in.
Nwafor Orizu refused!!!!
He said he needed to
contact Zik first, who was then in West Indies.
but Under the law, that is, the Interpretation Act, as
acting President, Nwazor Orizu had all the powers of
the President.
Dr. Orizu Nwafor alsorequested to see the rest of his NCNC colleagues to confirm whether they supported Shagari and his Npc membersproposition, and they joined them soon afterwards. They had apparently been caucusing at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence. He (Mbadiwe) was their choice of acting Prime Minister. This was naturally unacceptable to the NPC members since the NPC was the major governing party.
While they were at Orizu’s residence, Major-General Ironsi, who had seemingly secured Lagos, came in with some armed escorts. He requested for a tete-a-tete with Orizu. The two had a 40 minutes discussion in another room, while the rest of the cabinet members waited anxiously in the sitting room, with the General's stone faced, gun totting armed soldiers standing and staring at politicians expressionlessly. tensions were high and no body dared to move.
When Major-General Ironsi finally emerged, he talked to Dipcharima sotto voce; and then drove off with his troops. Dr. Orizu then joined the rest of the cabinet members, regretted his inability in the circumstances to oblige the NPC members request. He suggested they all return to their homes and wait until they were required.
All efforts to get any clarification failed, and they left in utter desperation.
on Sunday 16th January, all ministers were asked to report to the Cabinet Office at 6.30 pm. The whole premises was surrounded by soldiers in battle order that some of the cabinet members initially hesitated to enter, out of fear of the unknown as the military boys have shown how blood thristy they were with their action at the just failed coup.
In the Cabinet chamber were Major General Ironsi, Bukar Dipcharima and Ibrahim Tako Galadima. There were no officials present. Shagari and a few cabinet members later joined the meeting before
Major General Ironsi admitted to them that he had been unable to suppress the rebellion, which he said was getting out of hand. He stated that the mutineers were in control of Kaduna, Kano and Ibadan, and had killed two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola. They had also murdered a number of his best officers, including Brigadiers Maimalari and Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun, the Commander 1st Brigade Headquarters in Kaduna. Ironsi was full of emotion and even shed some tears. When the politicians asked him about the whereabouts of Sir ABubakar and Chief Okotie-Eboh, he said he still did not know but averred efforts were being made to locate them. At this stage Mbadiwe broke down and kept crying: “Please where is the Prime Minister?”
Ironsi's private coup
When they reminded Major-General Ironsi if he needed to avail himself of the British pledge of assistance, he replied it was too late as the army was pressing him to assume power. Indeed, he confessed his personal reluctance to take over because of his ignorance of government; but insisted the military boys were adamant and anxiously waiting outside.
these words sent rays of fear and anxiety through the hearts of the politicians who were sorrounded by the military boys .
He advised it would be in the cabinet members interest, and that of the country, to temporarily cede power to him to avert disaster.
the threat was boldly written in his words.
I have read in many books from ignorant writers and teachers saying that the cabinet members and politicians
handed over to the military voluntarily . but its all lies! they did not hand-over voluntarily . it was taken from them in a silent office coup!
Ironsi told them that "you either hand over as gentlemen
or you hand-over by force".
Those were his words.
And according to Chief Richard Akinjide, In July 2000, at a public book launching ceremony in Nigeria, (Chief Richard Akinjide, was a member of the Balewa cabinet and present at the meeting on that day ironsi took power from them,) he stated and i quote :
"Is that voluntary hand-over? we did not hand-over. all we wanted was
an Acting Prime Minister to be in place but
Ironsi forced our hands, and I use the word force advisedly,
to handover to him. He was controlling the soldiers.
The acting President, Nwafor Orizu, who did not
cooperate with the rest of us (politicians, cabinet members), cooperated with the GOC. Dr. Orizu
and the GOC prepared speeches which Nwafor Orizu
broadcast handing over the government of the country
to the army. I here state again categorically as an informed
Nigerian and a member of the balewa cabinet, that cabinet members did not hand-over
voluntarily. It was a coup..."
so Accordingly, they acceded to his request since they had no better alternative.
Ironsi then insisted that the understanding be written.
Surprisingly, there was no stationery to write the agreement; and all the offices were locked while no official was around. Alhaji AGF Abdulrazaq the Minister of State for the Railways (former NPC legal adviser), managed to secure a scrap paper on which he drafted a statement, which we endorsed. That was the so called voluntary hand-over of power by the Balewa Government to Major General Ironsi! It was agreed that the statement would be typed and Dipcharima would sign it on their behalf. they were then advised to return home and await further instructions.
Later at 11.50 pm, Dr. Orizu made a terse nationwide broadcast, announcing the cabinet’s voluntary decision to transfer power to the armed forces. Major General Ironsi then made his own broadcast, accepting the “invitation”. He suspended certain parts of the constitution; set up a national military government, with the office of military governors in each region; and briefly outlined the policy intentions of his regime.
Nigeria’s first democratic experiment was effectively over. And although the mutiny had by then practically collapsed, military rule had arrived. It was a fact.
The following morning, 17 January,
it broke that both the PM and Chief Okotie-Eboh had been confirmed killed. news and rumours also hinted that Major General Ironsi was still negotiating with the rebels in Kaduna, led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu.
Then Lt. Col. (later General) Gowon, who was not physically present when the rump cabinet was handing over, says he was later told by Ironsi and other officers (who were outside the cabinet office chambers, and thus did not themselves witness the event) that it was "called" voluntary handover. He recalls asking three separate times to be certain, but now says that had he known it was not, he would have acted differently on that day as the Commander of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja which supported Ironsi in putting down the Ifeajuna-Nzeogwu revolt.
it must be noted that: Nnamdi Azikiwe, also of eastern origin, had left the country in late 1965 first for Europe, then on a health cruise to the caribbean, after allegedly being tipped off by his cousin, Major Ifeajuna, one of the masterminds of the coup and, some say, overall leader.Interestingly, (assuming reports that he had foreknowledge are true) Azikiwe did not notify his alliance partner, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, with whom he had clashed over control of the armed forces during the Constitutional crisis of January 1965, following the controversial December 1964 federal elections.
In fact President Azikiwe’s personal physician, Dr. Humphrey Idemudia Idehen, abandoned him abroad when he got tired of the “health trip”, unaware that there may have been a good reason why Azikiwe did not want to return to Nigeria, after their original planned return date in December 1965 passed. Not even the Commonwealth Leaders’ Conference hosted for the first time by the country in early January was incentive enough for the President to return, for obvious reasons of protocol.However, after the coup, in a statement to the Press in England on January 16, among other things, Azikiwe did not condemn the coup per se, but said:
“Violence has never been an instrument used by us, as founding fathers of the Nigerian Republic, to solve political problems. ….I consider it most unfortunate that our 'Young Turks' decided to introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian politics. No matter how they and our general public might have been provoked by obstinate and perhaps grasping politicians, it is an unwise policy……..As far as I am concerned, I regard the killings of our political and military leaders as a national calamity….”
And in offering condolences for the death of the Sardauna of Sokoto, ex-Senate President Nwafor Orizu told Alhaji Shehu Shagari that Major Nzeogwu was “an unknown entity among the Ibos in the Eastern region.
then again Ironsi agreed not to bring the mutineers to military trial.
these reasons point most soldiers and politicians of the northern origin to believe that clearly the igbos had a grand plan all along and that ironsi take over was a plan B.
Clash Of The Titans
Major Ifeajuna was later to be accused by Major Patrick Nzeogwu, leader of northern operations, of ignoring an apparent understanding to assassinate General Ironsi in Lagos - an oversight, or “misguided consideration” (to use Nzeogwu’s words)that caused the failure of the coup.Indeed, Nzeogwu bluntly declared publicly that the execution of the coup in the South was tribalistic. Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd), leader of operations in the Western region, has since corroborated the view that operations in Lagos were compromised by nepotism.
Those who have defended the January mutiny as being motivated by nationalistic, rather than tribal instincts, say Ironsi escaped because he had gone for a party on a Boat along the Marina that night and was not at home when mutineers allegedly came calling. Tenuous explanations exist for why the Igbo speaking Premiers of the Midwest and Eastern regions were spared and no Igbo commanding or staff officer was specifically targetted. January apologists also say that there were a few non-Igbo officers involved (although none were entrusted with key targets and most were brought in at the last minute). It is argued that the mainly Igbo speaking plotters intended to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a westerner) from jail in Calabar to make him leader. Others interpret the same information, combined with the highly specific pattern of killings, to mean that the coup was carried out by officers sympathetic to the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), although hijacked by the GOC of the Nigerian Army, possibly encouraged by Senate President Nwafor Orizu, and urged on by officers like Lt. Col. Victor Banjo, Lt-Col. Francis Fajuyi, Lt. Col. H. Njoku, Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu and Major Patrick Anwunah.
On January 17,Major General Ironsi established the Supreme Military Council in Lagos and announced Decree No. 1, effectively suspending the constitution, although it was not formally promulgated until March.Later that day Major Nzeogwu, the leader of the revolt in the northern region negotiated a conditional surrender in which Ironsi agreed not to bring the mutineers to military trial.The next day, military governors were appointed for each of the four regions (Major Hassan Katsina – North, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu – East, Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi – West, and Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Midwest).
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo was briefly summoned back from the Imperial Defence College where he was undergoing a course.Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, erstwhile Chief of Staff, Nigerian Defence Forces, was made Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters.Lt. Col. Yakubu Chinwa Gowon, the most senior surviving northern officer, who was in the process of assuming command of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja on January 14/15, a unit which proved critical to restoration of order in Lagos, was made Chief of Staff (Army).
Other early military appointments include:
Chief of Staff (NAF),Lt. Col.George Kurubo (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bde, Lt. Col. H. Njoku (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bn, Major H. Igboba (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Abeokuta Garrison, Major G. Okonweze (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 4 Bn, Major Nzefili (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Federal Guards, Major Ochei (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bn, Major D. Ogunewe (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bde, Lt. ColW. Bassey (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 3 Bn, Major Okoro (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Depot, Major F. Akagha (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 5 Bn,Major M. Shuwa (North)
It is said that there was initial euphoria by the public, even in the far north, against old ministers.However, there were some early problems too, which, to discerning eyes, were pregnant with foreboding.In his book “Years of Challenge”, Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia (rtd) recalls:
“Before January 15, 1966, I had thought that the Nigerian soldier was not blood thirsty, thus ruling out the possibility of a bloody coup. Events proved me wrong and forced me to change my opinion about the Nigerian soldier.Although the ordinary man on the street welcomed the CHANGE of government, rejoiced and danced away in ecstatic jubilation, the atmosphere was muggy.”
For example, in the West, AG/UPGA supporters settled scores against supporters of former Premier Akintola’s NNDP, creating a major crisis which evolved into an international refugee problem.It is said that 2000 refugees fled across the border to neighbouring Dahomey before the border was closed from January 16-26.No less than a thousand people were killed in the melee before Lt. Col.FA Fajuyi, the new military governor, detained surviving NNDP supporters allegedly for their own protection.In the North, there were some subdued early signs of a recoil among civilian elite, while unrest simmered in the Army.The net result was that Ironsi quickly felt threatened by Nzeogwu's supporters on one hand, and upset northern troops on the other.
at this point a full scale rebellion was eminent but no one knew for sure where it will emanate from.. will the igbo soldiers return in a much stronger form to finish off the rest of the northerners in power to actualize their earlier suspected motive?
will the northern soldiers rise up against their igbo counterperts in revenge for what they termed a "betrayal of trust in the army"?
The country and its military at the time, was like a grenade with a faulty pin.
........ Then it happened... and that gave birth to a man termed the hero of the igbos from the primitive tribes of the lower Niger!
.... stay tuned... NIGERIA MEMORIAL..
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